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Betrayals by Allies: How Geopolitical Calculations Are Derailing Billion-Dollar Arms Deals
November 27, 2025
The global arms trade is a strategic domain shaped not only by economic interests but also by alliance politics, security concerns, and geopolitical considerations. Throughout history, arms agreements worth billions of dollars have collapsed dramatically due to shifting political priorities or international crises. This article examines six significant case studies: (1) the confiscation of the Ottoman Empire’s dreadnoughts by the United Kingdom (1914), (2) the United States’ refusal to deliver fully paid F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan (1990), (3) France’s cancellation of the delivery of Mistral-class warships to Russia following the annexation of Crimea (2014), (4) Türkiye’s removal from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program due to its acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defense system (2019), (5) the collapse of the United States–United Arab Emirates F-35 agreement over concerns regarding Huawei infrastructure (2021), and (6) Australia’s cancellation of its submarine contract with France in favor of the AUKUS alliance (2021). These cases demonstrate that crises of trust among allies can result in substantial economic losses, strategic realignments, and diplomatic ruptures. The study reveals that the arms trade is not merely a commercial activity but a fragile arena in which trust, loyalty, and geopolitical calculations play decisive roles.
The global order and the international security environment are increasingly shaped by rising defense expenditures, Russia’s growing aggression, and China’s expanding military capabilities. These developments should not be viewed as isolated events but rather as indicators of a broader trend toward militarization and concerns over wartime inventory resilience (SIPRI, 2025; IISS, 2025). High-value military procurement agreements, particularly those involving advanced technologies, have become increasingly vulnerable to political and geopolitical fluctuations (Panazan & Gheorghe, 2025; Vivoda et al., 2025). One of the most striking examples is Türkiye’s removal from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program by its NATO ally, the United States, following Ankara’s acquisition of the Russian-made S-400 air defense system. Despite Türkiye’s substantial industrial participation and investment in the program, its exclusion was widely criticized as neither ethical nor equitable (Mehta, 2019; Defence Industry Europe, 2025). The United States justified its decision by arguing that the F-35’s stealth technology could be compromised through exposure to Russian radar systems (IISS, 2019; Bowman & Ciddi, 2025). By contrast, India’s acquisition of the same S-400 system did not prevent Washington from considering F-35 sales through strategic exemptions, illustrating that geopolitical interests among major powers often outweigh commercial commitments (PTI, 2022; Rajeev, 2025; Shukla, 2025).
These developments demonstrate that major arms trade agreements are shaped not only by their economic value but also by national security concerns, political pressures, and geopolitical alignments (Muharremi, 2025). Shifting strategic priorities frequently override signed contracts, concerns over technology transfer can lead to the exclusion of purchasing states, and domestic political pressures may halt previously approved agreements. Such disruptions weaken trust between partners, encourage countries to seek alternative suppliers, and in some cases accelerate regional arms races. In response, some states choose to strengthen their domestic defense industries (Kacır, Şeker, & Doğrul, 2022), thereby contributing to broader shifts in the global balance of power. Consequently, failures in the arms trade generate not only economic losses but also weakened alliances, declining mutual trust, and increased fragility within the international security architecture. Defense trade has therefore evolved beyond a purely commercial activity into a central instrument of geopolitical maneuvering and strategic competition.
On the eve of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire ordered two modern battleships, Sultan Osman and Reşadiye, from British shipyards using funds raised through public donations (Güvenç, 2005; Suciu, 2020). While Ottoman crews were already in Britain preparing to take delivery, Winston Churchill ordered the ships to be requisitioned for the Royal Navy in August 1914 and refused to refund the approximately £2 million that had already been paid (Armingallsides, n.d.; Suciu, 2020). This decision caused profound disappointment within the Ottoman Empire and accelerated its political alignment with Germany. Shortly afterward, Germany transferred two warships, including the battlecruiser Goeben, to the Ottoman Navy, and by the end of the year the Ottoman Empire had entered the war on the side of the Central Powers. The confiscated battleships subsequently served in the Royal Navy as HMS Agincourt and HMS Erin, eventually operating against the very state that had purchased them (Miertzschke, 2019). This episode remains one of history’s clearest examples of national security considerations overriding commercial agreements and fundamentally reshaping alliance structures.
During the Soviet–Afghan War, Pakistan was one of the United States’ closest allies and purchased dozens of F-16 fighter aircraft from Washington. However, with the end of the Cold War, strategic priorities shifted. In October 1990, the United States invoked the Pressler Amendment, citing concerns that Pakistan was secretly developing nuclear weapons, and refused to deliver the 28 F-16 aircraft that Pakistan had already ordered (Hathaway, 2000). Pakistan had paid approximately US$650 million but received neither the aircraft nor an immediate refund. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto protested the decision, stating, “We paid for them. What belongs to us should be returned to us” (Los Angeles Times, 1995). After eight years of dispute, the United States provided approximately US$620 million in compensation through cash and military equipment, while the aircraft were eventually sold to third countries. The crisis severely undermined Pakistan’s trust in the United States and encouraged Islamabad to deepen its defense cooperation with alternative partners such as China. From Washington’s perspective, however, the decision demonstrated its commitment to preventing nuclear proliferation.
In 2011, France signed a contract worth approximately €1.2 billion with Russia for the construction and delivery of two Mistral-class amphibious assault ships. The agreement represented the first sale of military equipment of this scale from a NATO member to Russia and was promoted by President Nicolas Sarkozy (2007–2012) as a strategic initiative (Doe, 2014). However, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its military involvement in eastern Ukraine, the agreement became politically untenable (France 24, 2015). Under pressure from NATO and the European Union, President François Hollande (2012–2017) suspended the delivery and formally canceled the contract in 2015, aligning France with Western sanctions against Russia.
The cancellation produced significant legal and financial consequences. Russia had already paid approximately €893 million in advance, prompting both parties to reach a negotiated settlement rather than pursue lengthy arbitration. France refunded the advance payment and also covered additional costs, including the training of Russian naval personnel and the removal of Russian-installed equipment from the vessels. According to official statements, the total financial cost remained below €1.2 billion (Kryvoi, 2014). Russia refrained from initiating legal proceedings, while France later mitigated its losses by selling the ships to Egypt (France 24, 2015). Although the decision demonstrated France’s willingness to prioritize NATO and European Union solidarity over commercial obligations, it also sparked debate over whether the politically motivated cancellation of a signed defense contract—even if justified—had damaged France’s credibility as a reliable defense supplier.
One of the most significant fractures within NATO occurred in 2019. Türkiye planned to acquire at least 100 F-35 fighter aircraft and had become a key industrial partner responsible for producing more than 900 components for the program (Oğuz, 2023). However, driven by its national defense requirements, Ankara purchased the Russian-made S-400 air defense system in a deal worth approximately US$2.5 billion. The United States and NATO argued that the system was incompatible with NATO infrastructure and posed a risk that the F-35’s stealth capabilities could be exposed to Russian intelligence through the S-400’s radar systems (Stein, 2019). Following the arrival of the first S-400 deliveries in Türkiye, Washington removed the country from the F-35 program. The training of Turkish pilots was suspended, industrial partnerships were terminated, and four completed F-35 aircraft designated for Türkiye remained in the United States (Trimble, 2025).
For Türkiye, the decision meant the loss of access to a next-generation combat aircraft and an estimated US$9 billion in long-term industrial revenues. The United States, meanwhile, incurred additional costs estimated at US$500–600 million to reorganize the aircraft’s supply chain (Yıldırım, 2019). Washington justified the decision by citing both program requirements and new legislative measures. The U.S. Congress prohibited the transfer of F-35 aircraft to Türkiye, and in 2020 the Trump administration imposed sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) (Işık, 2021). Although Ankara described the decision as a “betrayal,” its participation in the F-35 program effectively came to an end (Spring, 2017). In response, Türkiye shifted its focus toward modernizing its F-16 fleet and accelerating the development of its indigenous fifth-generation fighter aircraft, KAAN (Yaylali, 2025). This crisis illustrates how alliance security concerns can override commercial agreements, while also demonstrating that the United States continues to use arms trade as a strategic instrument to advance broader geopolitical objectives.
Table 1. Key Milestones in the Türkiye F-35 Crisis
| Date | Event | Significance |
| 2006 | Türkiye launched the T-LORAMIDS air defense program. | This marked the beginning of its search for a long-range air defense system. |
| 2009–2015 | Türkiye negotiated for the U.S.-made Patriot and the Chinese-made FD-2000 systems. | Neither option provided the desired technology transfer, ultimately highlighting Türkiye’s determination to develop indigenous capabilities. |
| 2017 | Türkiye signed an agreement for the Russian-made S-400 system. | This marked its formal departure from U.S.- and NATO-compatible systems. |
| 2019 | The United States suspended the delivery of F-35 equipment to Türkiye. | This was the first concrete retaliatory measure taken in response to the S-400 agreement. |
| July 2019 | The first S-400 batteries arrived in Türkiye. | This triggered the United States’ formal response. |
| July 2019 | The United States formally removed Türkiye from the F-35 program. | This marked the official termination of the partnership. |
| July 2019 | The United States imposed sanctions under CAATSA. | This provided the legal mechanism for terminating the agreement. |
| 2024 | The United States approved the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Türkiye following Sweden’s accession to NATO. | This reflected a shift toward transactional diplomacy in response to changing geopolitical priorities. |
Table 2. Economic and Industrial Impacts of Türkiye’s Removal from the F-35 Program
| Party | Economic Cost | Details |
| ABD | US$500–600 million | The Pentagon’s estimated cost of replacing more than 900 components previously manufactured by Turkish suppliers. |
| Turkey | Approximately US$9 billion | Estimated loss of revenue from F-35 component manufacturing contracts over the lifetime of the program. |
| Turkey | Loss of Industrial Opportunities | U.S. defense officials stated that Türkiye would lose industrial participation as well as future economic opportunities. |
| Turkey | Promotion of Domestic Production | As an alternative, Türkiye shifted its focus toward indigenous and national defense programs. |
In examining the U.S.–Türkiye F-35 crisis, it is also necessary to address India’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system. When compared with Türkiye’s case, this development reveals a significant difference. Like Türkiye, India faced the threat of U.S. sanctions under CAATSA because of the acquisition. Unlike Türkiye, however, the U.S. House of Representatives granted India a country-specific waiver that prevented the sanctions from being imposed (The Economic Times, 2022), and India and the Trump administration subsequently reached an agreement regarding the F-35 (Shukla, 2025). This decision was widely interpreted as reflecting India’s strategic importance to Washington as a regional counterweight to China (RSIS, 2025).
This contrast demonstrates that U.S. policy on the F-35 is not based on a consistent standard but is instead employed as a flexible instrument of foreign policy. While Türkiye’s purchase of the same system was deemed unacceptable on the grounds of NATO security—more precisely, U.S. security—India’s acquisition was tolerated because of the geopolitical context and the country’s strategic significance. This clearly illustrates that the international arms trade is shaped not only by legal and contractual rules but also by alliance relations and great-power competition.
The US$23 billion agreement between the United States and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for the sale of F-35 fighter aircraft and MQ-9B drones was suspended after Washington raised concerns that the UAE’s Huawei 5G infrastructure posed a security risk (CRS, 2021). The United States argued that the Chinese telecommunications network could compromise the F-35’s highly sensitive data systems through espionage. In response, Abu Dhabi described the U.S. conditions as “onerous,” stating that it felt caught in the middle of a new U.S.–China Cold War, and ultimately withdrew from the agreement. Instead, the UAE purchased 80 French Rafale fighter aircraft (Reuters, 2021; The Washington Institute, 2021).
This case demonstrates that the security of advanced military technology extends beyond the protection of weapons systems themselves and increasingly depends on a country’s entire technological ecosystem (Salmon et al., 2024). The U.S. demand that Huawei infrastructure not be used illustrates how an arms supplier can exert influence over the sovereign and commercial infrastructure of the purchasing state. More broadly, it highlights that modern arms sales now require not only the transfer of military hardware but also comprehensive technological compatibility and geopolitical alignment.
In September 2021, Australia abruptly canceled a multibillion-dollar contract with the French defense company Naval Group for the construction of conventional submarines, despite the project having been underway for more than a decade. Instead, Australia announced a new trilateral security partnership with the United States and the United Kingdom known as AUKUS. The agreement would provide Australia with access to nuclear-powered submarine technology and offer capabilities considered better suited to the Indo-Pacific security environment shaped by China’s growing influence (Reuters, 2021; Politico, 2021).
France was informed only a few hours before the decision was made public and described the move as a “stab in the back.” The dispute rapidly escalated into a diplomatic crisis, prompting France to recall its ambassadors from both Canberra and Washington. Although Australia paid Naval Group approximately US$835 million in compensation (Turdef, 2021), the episode demonstrated how a shift in geopolitical priorities can override even long-standing commercial and strategic partnerships between close allies. Then Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison (2018–2022) defended the decision as being in the country’s national interest, while French President Emmanuel Macron accused him of lying and emphasized that trust between the two sides had been seriously damaged (BBC, 2021; Defense.info, 2021).
Ultimately, the collapse of the submarine agreement showed that strategic calculations can take precedence over economic commitments even among close allies (The Hindu, 2022; The Diplomat, 2021). Although France later prioritized rebuilding its relationship with Australia, the case remains a striking example of how changing security priorities—particularly in the Indo-Pacific context—can destabilize long-established alliances.
The cases examined reveal recurring patterns regarding why major arms procurement agreements fail and the consequences that follow. Foremost among these factors are shifts in alliance structures and geopolitical priorities. In 1914, Britain seized the Ottoman dreadnoughts after concluding that the Ottoman Empire might align itself with the opposing side as war approached. Similarly, in 2014, France canceled the delivery of the Mistral-class warships to Russia following the annexation of Crimea, prioritizing NATO solidarity over a profitable commercial contract under pressure from its allies. In 2021, Australia terminated its multibillion-dollar submarine agreement with France and instead joined the AUKUS partnership with the United States and the United Kingdom. This decision demonstrated that when security priorities change, even long-standing agreements between close allies can be canceled overnight, and diplomatic relations may deteriorate significantly despite the payment of compensation (BBC, 2021). A comparable pattern emerged within NATO during the U.S.–Türkiye F-35 crisis. Türkiye’s acquisition of the Russian-made S-400 air defense system was perceived as a threat to NATO security and resulted in the country’s removal from the F-35 program (Bensaid, 2019). After being unable to acquire the Patriot system, Türkiye signed an agreement with Russia in 2017 to meet its long-range air defense requirements (Sanders & Akca, 2020). By contrast, although India’s purchase of the S-400 could theoretically have triggered CAATSA sanctions, the United States tolerated the acquisition by granting a country-specific waiver as part of its broader strategy to balance China’s growing influence (The Economic Times, 2022; RSIS, 2025). Likewise, in the 1990s, the United States suspended the delivery of F-16 aircraft to Pakistan after the end of the Cold War, as Pakistan’s strategic value declined and its nuclear program conflicted with Washington’s non-proliferation policies. Similarly, the United Arab Emirates lost its US$23 billion F-35 agreement after U.S. concerns regarding the espionage risks associated with Huawei’s 5G infrastructure, ultimately choosing French Rafale fighter aircraft instead (Reuters, 2021; The Washington Institute, 2021). Collectively, these cases demonstrate that when an ally is perceived as supporting a strategic rival or undermining alliance security, even multibillion-dollar defense agreements can be abandoned, illustrating that perceived betrayal among allies is indeed possible.
Political change has also reinforced these disruptions. The rise of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Ottoman Empire, the post-Cold War insistence of the U.S. Congress on nuclear non-proliferation, and Türkiye’s pursuit of a strategy of “strategic autonomy” (Süsler, 2025) all contributed to rendering agreements negotiated under previous political circumstances ineffective. India’s case further illustrates the importance of political leadership and strategic autonomy. While maintaining close ties with Moscow, New Delhi successfully persuaded Washington to adopt a more flexible approach toward CAATSA sanctions (RSIS, 2025). In contrast, the UAE’s determination to preserve its commercial relationship with China conflicted with U.S. security requirements and ultimately contributed to the collapse of the agreement. In contemporary cases, legal frameworks have also served to legitimize such decisions. The Pressler Amendment in Pakistan’s case, CAATSA sanctions in Türkiye’s case, and European Union and NATO decisions in France’s case all provided legal justification for politically motivated actions, although these measures frequently resulted in international legal disputes and arbitration proceedings.
The economic and reputational consequences have been substantial. The Ottoman Empire permanently lost its dreadnoughts without receiving any compensation. Pakistan recovered only part of its payment after years of negotiations. Russia ultimately recovered its advance payment for the Mistral warships but endured prolonged uncertainty throughout the process. Türkiye lost both its investment in the F-35 program and the prospect of billions of dollars in long-term industrial revenues, while the United States incurred hundreds of millions of dollars in additional costs to restructure its supply chain. The United Arab Emirates redirected its procurement toward the Rafale fighter aircraft, whereas India preserved its strategic position through the U.S. waiver. From the suppliers’ perspective, these cases also raised broader questions regarding reliability, leading to increased doubts about the commitment of both France and the United States to honoring signed defense contracts.
In international politics, arms agreements and defense trade have long represented far more than simple commercial transactions; they constitute a complex domain in which trust, loyalty, and strategic considerations are deeply intertwined. When geopolitical balances shift or alliance relationships weaken, even multibillion-dollar agreements can be rendered void almost overnight. The consequences of such failures extend well beyond economic losses, often producing lasting fractures in alliance structures and diplomatic relations. As a result, states are increasingly seeking to diversify their defense suppliers, strengthen their indigenous defense industries, and continuously redefine their strategic partnerships. The historical cases examined in this study demonstrate that, in the defense trade, political interests and security commitments ultimately outweigh financial considerations. These episodes of perceived betrayal among allies underscore that strategic calculations, rather than economic value alone, remain the decisive factor in determining the success or failure of major international arms agreements.
Ramazan Turan, Attorney-at-Law
Attorney • Mediator • Legal Consultant
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mürsel Doğrul
National Defence University